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I. The Meaning of Faith
Mohamed Suliman’s lovely and famous song for the Eid is not only 
suggestive of the joys of the past but reminisces about the great values 
that the Somali people shared and which served them well during test-
ing times of yesteryear. Here is a line from the song:
Hadba kii arrin keena Ka kalee aqbalaaya Ilaahii ina siiyay isagaa ku 
abaal leh
Simply put, this line and the spirit of the whole song echo Somalis’ 
traditional acumen to generate timely ideas and the competence to lis-
ten and heed productive compromises. These attributes that nurtured 
their collective best interests have been on the wane for three decades 
and are now in peril or even to perish for eternity. As a result, much 
despair is visible in the Somali landscape. Yet it is worth remembering 
that there is no inevitability about the extension of the present despon-
dency into the future as long as civic-minded Somalis are resolute and 
remain wedded to their compatriots’ well-being and cardinal values.
The concept of Faith has triple meanings in the context of this brief 
essay (Figure 1). First, it means devotion to the Creator and the straight 
path of Islam. This is clear from the core principles of Islam (not as 
defined by sectarian ideologues but by the Qur’an and the Haddith), 
one of which is imaan. Second, Faith enshrines self-reliance and the 
effort to pull oneself up by the bootstraps as well as attend to the needs 
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of one’s family. Third, Faith presupposes confidence in the communi-
ty’s (neighborhood or nation) commitment to justice and fairness for 
all its members. These three dimensions do not exhaust the richness of 
the concept, but they provide enough scaffolding for this article. The 
essay’s focus is particularly on the first, with secondary implications 
for the latter. Implicit in the essay is the assumption that there was a 
time in Somali history when leaders and the general population were 
true to the edicts of imaan in public and family spheres. As the discus-
sion will show, these two have been battered for the past three decades. 
The genealogy of Somalia’s betrayal had four phases and the pathways 
to its rejuvenation will minimally require a return to the Faith—one 
sophisticated enough to cut through the muck of this age and with 
assurance to meet a globalizing and inter-civilizational world.
II. Faith and Freedom
A. Faith under Colonialism
The struggle against British and Italian colonialism was initiated at the 
turn of the previous century by the twin forces of Islam and Somalis’ 
sense of being in the world. Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, 
charged by the demands of the colonial officers to abstain from calling 
for morning prayers in Berbera and infuriated by the Christianiza-
tion of Somali orphans, took the lead to rid the country of the colonial 
scourge.1 Despite the existence of common values and heritage, it was 
extraordinarily difficult to mobilize the population for an anti-colonial 
resistance. In addition, the scarcity of military and material resources, 
and a nonexistent communication infrastructure, were major barri-
ers to unified and collective action. Sayyid Mohamed’s only instru-
ments that gained the attention of Somali people were Islam and the 
enormous power of his poetic gifts.2 The dearth of deep knowledge 
of Islam was compensated for by the strong attachment of Somalis 
to the axioms of the Faith. It was to this point that Sayyid Mohamed 
hitched his message of nationalist awakening. Most Somalis rallied to 
his side except for a few colonial lackeys or tribal chauvinists. Britain’s 
overwhelming power was so deeply and repeatedly frustrated by the 
Daraawiish’s skills that Somalia became the first colonial conflagra-
tion in which warplanes were used to subjugate freedom fighters. The 
guerilla tactics of the Daraawiish were so effective that they almost 
succeeded in driving the colonists out of the country in 1910. How-
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ever, hubris got the best of the leadership, which led them to fight a 
conventional war that ultimately resulted in the extinction of Somalia’s 
maiden war of liberation. This was a glorious war, which inspired 
modern Somali nationalism and ultimately gave birth to the Somali 
Youth League (SYL). What made the Sayyid and his movement endure 
for more than two decades in spite of the overwhelming odds against 
them were intolerance of indignity and steadfast loyalty to the Faith 
and to a common destiny. Disaster followed on the few occasions when 
the leadership deviated from these principles.
Once the major Somali/Islamic resistance was contained, British and 
Italian authorities (in their respective Somali colonies) had the chal-
lenge of manufacturing consent from the population. They thus sought 
to bring on board certain religious leaders. Such efforts mollified some 
of the antipathy toward colonial rule while deliberately heightening 
clanist identity as the principal political signifier of the native popula-
tion. This set in place a process whose dynamic continues to this day 
to undermine national solidarity. It was during this period of Islamic 
hibernation that anti-colonial movements led by the Somali Youth 
League/Somali National League (SYL/SNL) emerged.3 These parties 
tapped Islamic sentiments to rally the public for independence, but the 
rising political class never entertained a major role for Islam. Instead, 
it simply assumed the importance and presence of the faith in Somali 
lives and the new history. In the South, SYL came to dominate the 
political landscape after a brief period of existence. Word spread to all 
Somali territories, and, subsequently, the spirit of Somalinimo, which 
lay dormant for a quarter of a century, was resuscitated. Mogadishu 
became the nationalist hub. The managers of the Italian Trusteeship 
meted out utter cruelty to the SYL and its followers, often using what 
nationalists came to dub as “Pro-Italian” elements. Despite being out-
gunned and “out-resourced,” the Party maintained its resolve and the 
Figure 1: Dimensions of Faith
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population heeded its message of national unity, common civic belong-
ing, and freedom.4
Italy’s agenda of turning cultural genealogy into the principal politi-
cal Somali identity got its first thrashing in the municipal elections of 
1954, and the fate of such tactics was sealed by the overwhelming SYL 
victory in the 1956 election for the territorial assembly.5 What gave the 
Somali people confidence in SYL’s inclusive political program was the 
way in which all were treated equally. Second, the leadership exuded 
trust and devotion to the collective good. A most germane example 
was the resistance of key leaders of the party to take up ministerial 
portfolios in 1956.6 Nearly all the individuals that Premier-designate 
Abdullahi Isa approached declined his offer, noting that “they did not 
want to shame themselves given that they did not have commensurate 
skills or the experience to adequately tackle the demands of such oner-
ous responsibility.” Faith in SYL’s principles and fear of public ridicule 
were the reasons for their now stunning behavior (contrast this to 
today’s Transitional Federal Government and other aspirants).
B. Democracy and Faith
Political divisions between civic nationalists and sectarian entrepre-
neurs re-emerged in the North and in the South during the dying days 
of colonialism, but the nationalists remained dominant. After indepen-
dence, Somalia’s new leaders anchored the liberal national Constitu-
tion on Islam, as Articles 30 and 50 make clear. Article 30 declares that, 
“The personal status of Moslems is governed by the general principles 
of the Islamic Sharia” while Article 50 states that, “The doctrine of 
Islam is the main source of Laws of the State.”7 Despite these pro-
nouncements, the state’s political character was democratic and senior 
leaders were not concerned about political Islam.8 Yet, they were aware 
of the potential influence that Islamic leaders could command and 
attempted to channel it toward reinforcing the population’s commit-
ment to the faith while guarding against sectarian use of the faith for 
particularistic political ends.
The principal concern of the democratic leadership and those who 
remained faithful to the foundational principles of SYL and other 
civic-oriented parties was the gradual reshaping of sectarian elements 
in parliament. Some senior civil servants, whose core value was self-
enrichment, exploited the very authority that the public entrusted to 
them. The first major indication of this development came during 
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the 1961 constitutional plebiscite when two disgruntled leaders tried 
to undermine the referendum by tacitly mobilizing their genealogi-
cal groups to vote negative (because they or their friends were not 
appointed to the highest offices in the land). These two individuals 
were less concerned with destabilizing the young republic and more 
committed to exacting political revenge in the hope that the defeat of 
the Charter would humiliate the nation’s new leaders and thus afford 
them an unimpeded rise to power. These two senior ministers in the 
government failed to appreciate the value of supporting the Charter 
on its merits and honestly competing for political office in the presi-
dential election that immediately followed the plebiscite. What made 
this behavior bewildering was the fact that these men were among the 
architects of the constitution and thus had every opportunity to shape 
it and in fact did so. The majority of the Somali people thought differ-
ently than the two officials and endorsed the Charter. One of the two 
men took the challenge and ran for the presidency. His effort almost 
paid off but the founding president of the republic went on to win by 
three votes. The challenger’s camp refused to accept the verdict even 
after the Supreme Court verified the result.9 From then on, expedi-
ency became the guiding principle of the opposition. The democratic 
government was constantly confronted by opportunistic forces whose 
only manifesto was “bring down the government so we can take over.” 
Loyalty to the nation and the Constitution, as well as accountable gov-
ernment that served the public, were not their priority. Such a modus 
operandi was essentially at odds with Islamic principles and the demo-
cratic traditions of liberation and Somali culture. It set a noxious politi-
cal precedent for the country. Henceforth, most parliamentarians used 
their posts as a personal instrument for accumulating wealth and gain-
ing favors, rather than serving their constituencies and the country. It 
is this odious practice that attracted the incisive verse of Somalia’s poet 
laureate Timaade:
Members of parliament when we assembled them in one place,
Presidents and ministers when they were elected,
Healthy minds and people we were facing the same direction,
Then came those who confused us only to milk everything for their sole 
benefit,
Never to lose an electoral seat whose only intention it was,
In our rural areas they put a knife in every hand,
Those hacks who bombarded us with fake wailings of sectarian 
solidarity,
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The poison they injected in us killed nobility of character,
Lies and lies they festoon us with, Beware.10
Such behavior desecrated all three meanings of Faith and subse-
quently derailed Somali democracy and the rule of law.11 Figure 2 
illustrates the nature of this order rooted in faithlessness. This practice 
induced a gradual erosion of the common values that Somalis shared 
and the regime that came to power in 1967 took this to new heights.
C. Dictatorships of Mistrust
Just when the population was on the verge of despair the national army 
intervened and removed the regime from power, with an outpouring 
of endorsement by most of the citizens. The military’s honeymoon 
lasted for several years. A number of popular programs were under-
taken, such as the script for the Somali language, literacy campaigns, 
establishment of the national university, and investments in infrastruc-
ture. While the regime enjoyed popular legitimacy during this period, 
its governance paradigm was shifting quietly in troubling ways. The 
military regime slowly destroyed the public service establishment’s 
professional autonomy by first placing military officers at the head 
of every institution and then summarily appointing loyalists to posts 
for which they did not have qualifications. Fear replaced respect in 
the relationship between military political appointees and the profes-
sional cadre. Second, by the mid-1970s, recruitment and promotion in 
the military took on a distinctly clanist turn in ways never witnessed 
before in Somali public service.12 In sharp contrast to the democratic 
constitution, the military sidestepped the Sharia and secularized fam-
ily law. Once this was announced on national radio, it generated heated 
discussion about the religious character of the military leaders. The 
state proclamation reinforced the suspicion many Somalis had about 
“Godless communism.” Thereafter, a number of major imams began 
to preach in Mogadishu’s mosques and defied the regime’s authority to 
change such an elemental law, even if some of the modifications were 
in the right direction towards greater gender equality. Conscious of 
the explosive potential of the challenge, the military rounded up ten 
imams and took them to a hastily arranged national security court, 
which sentenced them to death. The sentence was carried out immedi-
ately, breaking the most cherished feature of postcolonial Somali poli-
tics: open political debate without state coercion or violence.
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This murderous use of sectarian power damaged the integrity of the 
system of order and the citizenry’s collective projects. Having lost the 
popular mandate, the regime turned to un-Islamic and un-Somali tools 
to prolong its hold on power. By 1980 degeneration quickened, culmi-
nating in the destruction of parts of Hargeisa and Burao, effectively 
alienating communities from one another. Here is how this author 
described that situation in 1989:
Peripheral-capitalist tribal politics came to prominence in the early 1960s 
as a means through which certain groups within [ruling elite] gained 
access to the state apparatus and its resources under the pressures of 
the competitive political marketplace. The employment of ethnicity as a 
political ideology…in Somalia unleashed destructive forces which razed 
the parliamentary electoral process, fractured the governing class, led 
to unprecedented emergence of a repressive and authoritarian regime, 
alienated communities from each other in ways previously unknown 
in Somali history, undermined the basis of state legitimacy, and, finally, 
threaten the very existence of Somalia as a country by swiftly and fatally 
maiming Somali nationalist ideology…13
Similarly, the political and military opposition adopted the regime’s 
tactics of dividing the nation into genealogical-political groups and 
thus substantially contributed to the devaluation of common belong-
ing. For twelve long years these two actors, bereft of faith in any sense 
of the word, dominated the landscape and created conditions uncon-
genial to good governance, healthy communities, and the promise of a 
better Somalia.
Figure 2: Faithless Order
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D. Gargoylia
As imaan evaporated, competition for state power and commensurate 
privileges became more grotesque. Civic-minded and faithful Somalis 
kept a low profile and failed to mobilize the population. By the time 
the military dictator was chased out of the capital, warlords and sec-
tarian political entrepreneurs had carved the county into fiefdoms, 
further depleting ethical capital. Bloodletting in Mogadishu in 1991 
and the killing fields of the Bay region in early 1991–92, with warlords 
using food as a weapon against hapless people, was the ultimate conse-
quence of a faithless power. The United Nations and the United States 
came to the assistance of the starving population, cleared the roads of 
the criminal gangs, and fed the indigent. Unfortunately, the humani-
tarian effort was not matched by a serious political investment to help 
the population rebuild their state institutions. Deleterious advice, 
based on an archaic worldview, wasted the fleeting opportunity and 
misdirected the effort, leading to the withdrawal of the multinational 
forces. The derangement of politics mushroomed into warlord and 
bigoted dominance and the misguided international community flirted 
with these monstrosities. The Somali peoples’ ordeal failed to attract 
sympathetic attention from powerful states. Yet the possibility of three 
criminals hiding in Somalia was sufficient justification for the world’s 
Superpower to provide more resources to the warlords and charge 
them to hunt down those suspected of giving these individuals ref-
uge. Tested by their prolonged agony, the population rallied around 
religious leaders. Within three months, the warlords were routed and 
Mogadishu was relatively calm for the first time in seventeen years. 
The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was formed and soon much of 
south-central Somalia became liberated.
E. Hope of Imaan’s Return
What made such speedy success possible? Loyalty to the Faith was the 
central “piston” in the emerging energy. Sentiments in the old capital 
were mobilized when the population realized that the warlords and 
their financial backers, who had no sympathy for their plight, were 
now willing to visit destruction on the people in order to capture three 
alleged terrorists. The confluence of these events and a rising temper of 
common Fate were reminiscent of 1949,14 when the world sided with 
the return of the Italian fascists and SYL led the charge to confront 
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this challenge. Faithful bonds can overcome towering menaces, as dis-
played in the people’s revolts in 1949 and 2006.
The UIC led the way and restored peace to the capital. Inspired by 
Islamic principles, the movement spread quickly and much of south-
central Somalia came under their sway. Even the renegade regions of 
the North and Northeast felt the heat, which quickly led their leaders 
to declare that they would adopt the Sharia as the law of the land. 
These swift successes concealed the serious systemic weaknesses of 
the UIC, best unveiled by the inability to manage the regions under 
its control. First, the UIC’s incoherence was a product of its recent 
founding as well as its quick rise to power. It had to hastily organize 
an assembly and executive committee after the movement’s victories 
became apparent. In other words, it did not have an organized institu-
tional infrastructure in place. Second, although it established an execu-
tive organ, the line of command (particularly in military affairs) was 
not clear and this led to some less-than-strategic campaigns. Third, the 
UIC leadership and assembly lacked the intellectual, diplomatic, and 
political competence to understand the dangers of a world dominated 
by a “war on terror” mentality. The group failed to heed advice that 
might have mollified those risks.15 Fourth, given the absence of tight 
organizational discipline, much time was devoted to endless meetings, 
which were in part used to build cohesion among a diverse member-
ship. Inevitability, this meant that relatively minor issues and details 
took center stage, and precious time was lost. Finally, the UIC’s lack 
of coherent and workable governance strategy—beyond the call for 
the Sharia to be the basic law of the land—added to the incapacity. No 
other administrative competence existed. Additionally, there was no 
negotiating plan to bring on board skeptical but sympathetic Somalis, 
or to seriously engage a hostile international community, the TFG, 
and others. This created opportunities for the enemies of the move-
ment to demonize the UIC, which provided political cover for the 
invaders. Despite all of these shortcomings, the spirit of Muslinimo and 
Somalinimo prevailed for six months and boosted the confidence of the 
Somali people to believe that they could restore peace to their land and 
begin governing themselves with dignity.
F. Struggling for Freedom and Faith
A ferociously hostile international climate and a determined Ethiopian 
enemy took advantage of the drawbacks of the UIC and derailed the 
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movement. Many commentators wrote off the UIC and the nationalist 
movement as the Ethiopian military committed heinous crimes against 
the population and destroyed life-sustaining systems the people had 
established during the previous fifteen years. More than 20,000 people 
were killed and 1.5 million had been displaced. The latter group and 
others face famine.16
Despite the war crimes the Ethiopian invaders committed, tough-
minded young Somalis rose to the occasion and mounted a fierce 
nationalist resistance that has defied the agenda of the invaders and 
their international backers. Consequently, the inept TFG, which was 
holed up in Baidoa and a neighborhood in Mogadishu guarded by 
Ethiopian and African Union forces, became irrelevant. Ethiopia tried 
to put the best face on its defeat by claiming to be withdrawing “victo-
riously.”17 What these developments make clear is that the cruelties of 
an invading force can never hold a free and mobilized people in bond-
age without paying a heavy price, and that invasion is unsustainable 
and can never bolster an illegitimate regime.
Somalia’s new freedom fighters energized the population inside and 
outside the country. Their sacrifices created the possibility for a nego-
tiated peace and genuine reconciliation. Harnessing the opportunity 
has been the responsibility of the leadership that called itself Alliance 
for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). This outfit was supposed to 
be a solidarity between the UIC, a handful of former members of the 
TFI parliament, and representatives from the diaspora, but the UIC 
was the core unit despite the pretensions of others. Unfortunately, the 
ARS and the UIC failed to develop a political strategy for re-liberation 
that honored and supported the resistance operations in the country. 
Moreover, the organizational ability of the UIC was compounded by 
the ineptitude of the parliamentarians and, collectively, they botched 
the effort. Having low capacity is not a crime in and of itself, and one 
must honor genuine effort that does not succeed due to incapacity, but 
incompetence is not the only thing that bedeviled the alliance. It has 
been apparent from the day the ARS was established that most of the 
parliamentarians were lusting for a way to parachute themselves back 
to the TFG and that their senior leaders were sponsored by the divisive 
tribal formula. In addition, they had neither the commitment nor the 
skills to engage in the tough-minded chess game with hostile interna-
tional forces. They thought that nice platitudes on the airwaves and a 
weak backbone against the pressure of the hostile forces were the per-
fect strategy to deliver them to power and introduce false peace and 
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reconciliation. What became clear in the last few months of negotia-
tions in Djibouti is the fact that the ARS leadership has been less than 
candid and less than strategic. It may have even engaged in activities 
and behavior that were fraudulent. Such conduct and deeds are best 
illustrated by concrete examples.
First, when the ARS leadership initiated its moves and went to Khar-
toum and Nairobi in March and April 2008, troubling signs appeared 
when they indicated their reluctance to consult with key members, 
including the executive committee, by unilaterally signing agreements. 
When they were called on this breach of trust, they vacated town and 
moved to Djibouti. There they began a unilateral project of dealing 
with the TFG under the supervision of a devious U.N. outfit. Simul-
taneously, they accused Eritrea of instrumentally using the resistance 
for its own ends.18 Despite the goodwill efforts of some members to 
resolve the problem and restore confidence, the leadership ignored 
their work, which led to a split in the group. Further attempts failed to 
bear fruit and the “negotiations” in Djibouti continued.
Second, despite the support of the people of Djibouti, the ARS wing 
in Djibouti fell apart as a cohesive unit because its two leaders uni-
laterally decided what the position of ARS was going to be in the 
negotiations. In addition, incompetence marred the operations and 
management of the process as the entire affair lacked planning and 
deliberation. For example, there was an ARS delegation that came to 
visit U.N. headquarters, but no preparation was made for them to 
partake in the discussions. The delegation sat as observers rather than 
participants in the Security Council Chambers, amply demonstrating 
the organization’s ineptitude.
Third, another manifestation of the drift from the straight path 
became clear as the negotiations reached a high point when joint com-
mittees (composed of the TFG and ARS) were to be formed. One such 
committee was to consist of seven members from the TFG and seven 
from ARS, but the head of the ARS Council asked the Executive that he 
be allowed to add six extra members of his choosing. He added that he 
would make the request to the U.N. representative. This was allowed, 
and the rest is history.
Fourth, the final act of the negotiations was the agreement stipulat-
ing that 275 new ARS representatives would be added to the already 
existing 275-person TFG parliament. This was not only offensive to the 
Somali people, but also demonstrated the absence of coherence as the 
former Speaker of the Parliament is reported to have proposed that he 
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would “select 30% of the new MPs while the Hawiye tribe can share 
the remainder.”
Fifth, the head of the ARS Djibouti wing met with tribal groups in 
Mogadishu to try and work out a political deal, thus reneging on the 
UIC’s original motto of avoiding tribal politics. This particular affair 
was bizarre as he tried to replicate the very process that he and his 
comrades rejected when Ali Mahdi Mohamed tried the same maneuver 
in 2007. Lastly, the ARS Djibouti wing finally exposed its true colors by 
accepting the foul 4.5 formula as the basis of re-establishing Somali 
national institutions. This made the ARS political agenda identical to 
that of the TFG. In the end, the leaders of the Djibouti wing appointed 
200 new MPs, who, in turn, voted to select their patron as president of 
the TFG. Subsequently, a prime minister was appointed, but he was 
deprived of selecting his cabinet, thus creating a farce. In effect, the 
ARS Djibouti wing became the dominant force in the TFG and has 
effectively traded the original faith-based agenda for their political 
ambition by breaching the ARS Charter as well as the anchor values 
of the UIC. In other words, they seem not to cherish any principles or 
agreements but subscribe to political expediency and, thus, embrace 
the faithless politics of the past—leadership without imaan and, there-
fore, no amaano! One must ask, then, the tough questions: was the dam-
age exacted upon the population based on the 4.5 formula? Were those 
who sacrificed their lives for the liberation motivated by 4.5? If decep-
tion had moral persuasion, the old politicians would still be reigning.
In addition to these diversions from the straight path of imaan, sig-
nificant elements of the “Shabaab” and members of the Courts have 
proposed that they and they alone have the wisdom and authority to 
interpret the tenets of the Faith. Furthermore, they are demanding that 
all others must live by this interpretation or be marginalized or elimi-
nated. In other words, their personal interpretation is deemed more 
sacred than the generous and flexible ways of Islam. Second, they are 
turning Islam into a most rigid, authoritarian, and violent enterprise 
when it is exactly the opposite. Third, they are failing to realize that 
physical coercion can never make a person faithful and that teaching, 
nurturing, and engaging people are the most effective ways to convince 
Somalis to live by the spirit and word of the Faith. If violence were sus-
tainable and effective, the old dictatorship and warlords would still be 
dominant. Such a strategy has no future.
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III. Faithful Politics: The Alternative Future
Neither the machinations of ARS/TFG as we know them now nor a sec-
tarian and perverted Islamicist rule will create the social and political 
climate required to restore imaan and rebuild the legitimate institutions 
the country so desperately needs.19 What, then, might be a formula 
that can build on the Faith and the democratic traditions of Somalis as 
well as the spirit of resistance? In the first instance, a regime founded 
on the odious 4.5 formula, headed by an Islamicist, is now in place, but 
it is unlikely to deliver the promise of peace and genuine reconcilia-
tion as it attempts to cling to power without a national agenda.20 This 
is not an option for the Somali people who have defeated the Ethio-
pian occupation and thwarted the so-called international community’s 
wrong-headed intent to impose an incompetent and tribal-based polit-
ical dispensation.
I remember quite well when some civic-minded Somalis called upon 
the international community not to sanction the Ethiopian agenda of a 
warlord/tribal government for Somalia. Its response was that the war-
lords were a necessary evil needed to restore the peace, and that this 
was the only option available. The international community proffered 
that Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was the tough guy who must be the head 
of state. His obstinate character would be enough to ensure that the 
Ethiopian regime would not have its way. Some people warned about 
the fallacy of these assumptions but insistence on it demonstrated 
either ineptitude to understand what was being said or it had the sole 
purpose of foisting a warlord outfit beholden to Ethiopia on the Somali 
people. It is ironic that the same actors have been clamoring to con-
demn Abdullahi Yusuf as the main obstacle to peace and to proclaim 
the invader’s departure as creating a security vacuum—a vacuum for 
the millions of people they displaced! More recently, they have been 
praising the new TFG head as a moderate and legitimate leader. It 
is worth remembering that it was only two years ago that Mr. Sharif 
Ahmed and the UIC were being cast as extremists who were bedfel-
lows of Al-Qaida. Unfortunately, there is nothing moderate about the 
leadership and the predatory cabal around the President as they imag-
ine schemes to defraud the population.
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A. From Faithless Power to Faithful Authority
Since 1967, the leaders of nearly all regimes have been marred by the 
absence of Faith and the dearth of counter-balancing institutions that 
could provide a sense of national orientation. Advocates of the trib-
alist thesis of Somali politics maintain that one of two scenarios can 
provide the basis of political stability in the country. First, they allege 
that a political regime based on the 4.5 formula will solve the problem 
of representation among Somalia’s “competing” clans. Second, they 
posit that a combination of 4.5 and a national assembly consisting of 
two houses, with one chamber dedicated to traditional “leaders,” will 
secure the tribal balance. We have detailed elsewhere the fairy tale 
of the tribalist thesis and why such propositions cannot and will not 
usher in a new era of faithful government and justice.21
Thus, ideas based on broadly understood Islam and civic identity 
can and will provide an alternative moral framework for a desirable 
future. Such grounding will not transpire through the amalgamation 
of the resistance with a defunct TFG, characterized by faithless power, 
because that has degraded the valor of the former. The power struggles 
between the two camps that claim to champion Islam have gutted the 
belief of the population in what used to be the UIC. Instead, cosmopoli-
tan religious leaders and civic nationalists must call for a national confer-
ence inside that shall produce a blueprint for the road ahead. One of 
the principal tasks of the conference should be to draw up the mandate 
of two parallel, non-competing, and counter-balancing institutions for 
the country. These will consist of a Moral Authority (MA) and a Polit-
ical Authority (PA) (Figure 3). A detailed presentation of the roles, 
responsibilities, and the operations of the two authorities will have to 
wait for another time, but this brief note should suffice as a prelude.
The Moral Authority will have four functions. First, it will be 
responsible for ensuring that Islamic and Somali cultural education 
are carried out across the country as part of a progressive curriculum 
designed to empower the society to partake in a globalizing Africa 
and world. Second, it will establish three major centers of Islamic and 
cultural learning in the country. Such centers will provide for a liberal 
interpretation of Islam and Somali traditions and shall not be domi-
nated by any closed-minded sectarian interpretations of the Faith and 
culture. Third and most critically, it will create another three regional 
centers where communal conflagrations are resolved fairly and justly 
so that such conflicts are not transformed into political mêlée. In addi-
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tion, these centers will become platforms for communal cooperation. 
Fourth, MA will be a nonpartisan national anchor for providing direc-
tion when and if the Political Authority diverges from the spirit and 
word of the Constitution or becomes dysfunctional. Finally, the MA 
will produce an annual report that will address the moral state of the 
nation and the country’s civic challenges. The report will be circulated 
through the airwaves as well as in community centers around the 
country.
Given the centrality of the Moral Authority for the nation’s collec-
tive well-being and its nonpartisan nature, it is vital that those who 
will serve as leaders and members of the MA have exceptional cred-
ibility, an unblemished record of faithful/civic life, and superb train-
ing in Islam and Somali cultural studies. Such members must not be 
affiliated with and or involved in political or sectarian organizations. 
The Authority will have eleven members appointed for a period of 
seven years and will conduct its affairs on a consensual basis. An inde-
pendently managed endowment will be established to provide the 
necessary resources for the operations of the authority, and the MA 
Figure 3: Faithful Order
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will have a weekly radio and TV program that will discuss the major 
concerns of the country in order to educate the public. An independent 
board of trustees will be created whose only job is to vet, appoint, and 
dismiss members. The board of trustees will have a reserve list of at 
least eleven people at all times.
The MA will not have legislative and coercive power, but will use 
education and moral persuasion as its instruments. It will have access 
to private and state media and shall have the authority to mobilize 
the population against injustice and bad governance, and for faithful 
and progressive change. Such an ethical establishment is intended to 
demonstrate to the population the importance of high Islamic/ethical/
Somali standards of public and communal life. Thus, the MA will not 
have the authority to dismiss governments but can inform the popula-
tion of its good and ill deeds and how the problems might be tackled.
Likewise, the Political Authority will consist of political parties and 
governments (local, regional, and national). To ensure that the coun-
try is not re-victimized by exclusive political parties and entrepre-
neurs, there can only be two national political parties. Each party will 
be required to have a national base through its membership. Neither 
party nor its leadership will be allowed to use Islam or tribal belonging 
as the basis of its membership or program. Second, the two parties will 
be monitored by a national inspectorate associated with the MA that 
will use the highest ethical and moral standards. Any party found to 
engage in unethical practices will be held responsible and the public 
will be informed about such practice. Third, there shall be established 
an independent electoral commission whose responsibility is to orga-
nize and conduct national and local elections in the country.
Deliberately separating the role and responsibilities of the MA and 
PA is vital. It is meant to warrant that the shared values—Islam and 
culture—are not used by political and sectarian entrepreneurs. Further, 
it will affirm that the nation’s institutional apparatus will maximize the 
use of and valorize the value of such assets. Simply put, it is not Somali 
faith or culture that has caused the catastrophe but the detachment of 
public power from such moral moorings. Resetting those principles as 
institutional anchors of public affairs will enhance stability and restore 
justice to the land. Put bluntly, in this new milieu, regimes and aspirant 
political actors intent on maldevelopment will never again be allowed 
to corrupt the spirit of ethical communality.
Finally, the need for such institutionalization of Faith and culture 
is paramount as it creates an independent authority that is not solely 
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driven by the lust for political power. I would venture that if the coun-
try had a legitimate moral voice when the crisis of governance began, 
the people would have had a trusted authority to turn to for guidance. 
Such an authority would have had the credibility to call on the people 
to maintain peace and order until a legitimate political dispensation 
was restored. Further, and more importantly, Somalis would have been 
sufficiently informed and educated about developments such that they 
would have stopped the abusive regimes long before the catastrophe. 
Only through this or similar methods of returning to faithful and com-
petent authority will the country emerge from the current calamity of 
faithless power in the guise of pseudo-Islamic politics and parodies.
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